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Life’s on Hold
Missing people, private calendars and
waiting
Susan Hogben
ABSTRACT. Intimate relationships are forged on and sustained by
the appreciation of mutually significant events. When someone is
missing, as a result of a reportedly unmotivated absence, expecta-
tions of the continuity of relationships are disrupted. Using data from
publicly available texts I examine how people experience such an
absence. Harvey Sacks’s notion of the ‘private calendar’ helps 
explicate how remaining family members experience literal and 
figurative desynchronization that suggests missing might be more
potently understood as waiting. Finally, it seems that the duration of
the absence helps family members account for the enduring lack of
communication. KEY WORDS • disruptive events • interstitial time
• missing people • private calendars • waiting • worry
Introduction
Time making and time measuring can currently be characterized in industrial,
commodified and compressed terms (Adam, 2003). Temporality also has a role
to play in how we generate a more intimate sense of self and in the organization
of our relationships (Mead, 1932; Maines et al., 1983; Flaherty and Fine, 2001).
Jenkins (2002) proposes that progressive time provides a fundamental unit for
conceptualizing who we are. He argues, ‘our past is who we have been, and the
future is fundamental to imagining who we will become. However, in order to
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have either past or future we need a stable present, the space of our everyday
lives’. Given the emphasis on stability for our and, by extension, a relationship’s
continuity (Sigman, 1991) we can appreciate how, when an intimate family
member, lover, friend, colleague or acquaintance is reported missing, the 
anticipation (and realization) of the future, the consistency of the past and the
stable present become disrupted.1
In this article I discuss the impact of someone being missing2 by considering
the role of time in three interrelated fashions. First, I examine how the routine
relevance of relationships can be understood through Sacks’s (1987) notion of
‘private calendars’ – the local means of organizing our relevance to others
through the appreciation of events of personal significance. I demonstrate how
the unexpected and prolonged absence of an intimate removes the availability of
private calendars to the extent that the disruption is experienced as a kind of 
suspension of normal service. I examine how missing might be more aptly
understood as interstitial (Gasparini, 2004); missing is experienced as a form of
waiting where anticipation is populated with both worry and hope. Finally, it
seems that the duration of the absence and the associated uncertainty provide
family members with a way to account for the missing person’s extended lack of
communication.
The Data
Many scholars (Weitzman, 1970; Hepworth and Featherstone, 1973, 1974;
Payne, 1995; Braid, 2000; Cowley, 2000; Boss, 2002; Rayner, 2002) observe
that public talk about missing people tends only to occur when a disclosure
about the missing person’s absence can act as a declaration of concern and func-
tion as a direct or indirect request for the ongoing undesirable state of affairs to
change. Alternatively, when missing is resolved (for example, when contact is
made or a missing person returns) those involved rarely want to discuss the time
of the absence (Braid, 2000; Cowley, 2000; Biehal et al., 2003). Capturing data
about missing is understandably somewhat restricted. For these reasons and 
others the data are taken from a representative range of public sources; a news-
paper report, textual missing person appeals3 and an episode of public participa-
tion television.4
Time and Relationships: The Role of the Private Calendar
Relationships have been predominantly theorized through metaphors of physi-
cal proximity in terms of ‘attachment’ (Bowlby, 1969) and ‘social bonds’
(Hirschi, 1969). Baumeister and Leary (1995) propose an extension by suggest-
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ing that relationships are better understood as articulations of ‘belongingness’.
Relationships are recognized and maintained, they suggest, ‘by stability, affec-
tive concern and continuation into the foreseeable future (p. 500).
For Sacks (1987) this consistency and continuity rely on mutual attention to
specific meaningful events. The relative significance of social, intimate, famil-
ial, institutional, collegial and sexual relationships is founded on the creation
and acknowledgement of special events within relationships. Importantly, these
events are treated as marks on a calendar which forge a referential framework
through which relationships become remarkable.
The calendar, in addition to organizing time in a linear, progressive fashion
(Coveney and Highfield, 1990: 26), acts as a temporal referent for general
events and might indicate moon phases, national holidays or culturally specific
celebrations that may or may not be treated as personally pertinent to the indi-
vidual calendar user. Calendars can also be customized or personalized (cf.
Symes, 1999) by marking dates which are privately apposite and peculiarly 
relevant to the individual calendar user, for example a father’s birthday, a dental
appointment, party invitation and the like. According to Sacks (1992a: 36–7),
this personalized use ensures that time becomes organized in relation to an indi-
vidual’s ‘relationships or biography’. Relationships develop what Sacks (1987)
terms ‘private calendars’ not as clandestine practice but as a means of locating
‘events within the relationship’ and understanding ‘events in the world in 
general, by reference to the relationship’ (p. 222). The significance of the latter
means that people can say things like, ‘Kennedy was assassinated two weeks
after we got engaged’ (p. 222).
An important feature of the private calendar comes through its contrast with
‘everybody’s calendar’ because ‘everybody’s calendar’ has a ‘guaranteed conti-
nuity’ that runs on into the ‘indefinite future without regard to anyone particular
being present’ (Sacks, 1987: 223). A private calendar is personalized because it
relies on particular people being available and active in the making and the
marking of (private) events. The need for certain people to be present has impor-
tant ramifications: a private calendar (and the significance of the events therein)
‘ends when “we” end’ (p. 223). That is to say, the termination of an intimate
relationship through, say, death or the relationship’s aborted continuity, for
example through divorce, means there will (most likely) be no more ‘events on
the private calendar ‘(p. 223) and so no more mechanisms for marking the 
private calendar.
Yet these two ‘ends’ differ. Following a death, Sacks (1987: 223) suggests the
survivor may still be able to mark private calendar events previously shared with
the deceased by reflecting safely on a normatively ended past; that is, events for
a bereaved private calendar user can still ‘occur sensibly in their lives’ and are
to greater and lesser degrees publicly permissible. An individual may recall 
personal(ized) events, anniversaries and the like without too much fear of 
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sanction. An event in a private calendar ended by death is available, if not for
renewal, then, for temporary restoration. This potential can be contrasted with
the more restricted use of private calendars in relationships that end by, say
divorce. Events in a private calendar which were once treated as mutually 
significant by those active in marking the relationship are, after separation, con-
sidered inappropriate referents to the extent that, as Sacks suggests, ‘one cannot
even retrospectively use the private calendar one had going’ (p. 223).
It seems that event referents, where a calendar-marking participant is
removed but still available, are considered inappropriate to recognize, share or
mark in subsequent relationships. These relationships in effect require the
creation of new calendars to render them mutually significant. Following sepa-
ration or estrangement a private calendar, like Cambodia under Pol Pot and the
Khmer Rouge, returns to a kind of ‘year zero’.
When we consider the impact of someone being missing it seems that neither
of these characterizations is wholly appropriate. The unexpected absence of a
family member produces a situation that is saturated with uncertainty. Where is
the missing person? Why is he/she absent? Why is he/she not in touch? When
and how will the situation be resolved? The multiple uncertainties throw into
confusion the status of the relationship and the role of the private calendar.
The newspaper article examined here (Goodchild, 2002; Figure 1) concerns
the, then, ongoing absence of 13-year-old Amanda Dowler who did not return
home from school on 21 March 2002. In the article, Amanda Dowler has been
missing for three months and, unlike hundreds of thousands of missing people
(Prasad, 2002), there was widespread sympathetic media coverage. The article
illustrates how her absence has consequences for the continuity of mundane
practices which are indicative of and significant to the routine maintenance of
relationships. 
The imminent arrival of Amanda Dowler’s birthday (Goodchild, 2002: line 8)
introduces one of the challenges that absence makes to the successful mainte-
nance of a relationship through the appreciation of and commitment to a private
calendar event. Family (and friends) are reportedly unsure about how to mark
events that are pertinent to the missing person and also relevant to the still 
present family and friends. Amanda Dowler’s father reports the collective
uncertainty (‘no one really knows what to do’; lines 8–9) surrounding, what the
reader can infer to be, the previously unremarkable and routine marking of birth-
days (‘they’re asking us if they should send cards’: line 9). The declaration of
the uncertainty around how to mark his missing daughter’s birthday appears to 
conjoin Sacks’s distinct options of when and how private calendars can reason-
ably end. There appears to be neither the possibility of ‘sensible’ restoration
(following bereavement) nor is the erasure of the event possible, as it is follow-
ing (mutual) separation.
While people may remember the date of a deceased person’s birthday it
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would be highly unusual for the deceased to be sent birthday cards. Indeed,
Pauline Boss (2002) appreciates the lack of ritualistic practices involving the
missing, pointing out that ‘there are no Hallmark cards for families and friends
of the partially missing, for those who disappeared, vanished without a trace’.
Yet, to not send a birthday card would indicate the erasure of 25 June (Amanda
Dowler’s birthday) from the Dowlers’ private calendar and, thus, the tacit
acceptance of a permanent end to that suspended relationship.
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Milly Is Probably Dead, Say Police
By Sophie Goodchild, Home Affairs Correspondent
1. The parents of the missing schoolgirl Amanda Dowler have made an 
2. emotional appeal for her return just days before her birthday. Bob and 
3. Sally Dowler spoke of their suffering since their daughter went missing
4. three months ago, and how they will cope on Amanda’s 14th birthday on
5. Tuesday. Police confirmed yesterday that they have told her parents 
6. Bob and Sally Dowler they believe that she is dead. Amanda, known as 
7. Milly, vanished on 21 March while walking home from school in Walton-
8. on-Thames, Surrey. “Her birthday is going to be so hard. No one really
9. knows what to do, for example, they’re asking us if they should send
10. cards,” said Mr Dowler. Father’s Day had been a “bad day”. “I hadn’t 
11. even thought about it being Father’s Day”, he said, “and then my 
12. daughter Gemma came downstairs and gave me a card. It took me
13. completely unawares. I just went through all the thoughts and emotions 
14. you can imagine. There’s normally two cards. It was a bad day”.
15. A nationwide hunt has failed to find any trace of Milly despite a £100,000
16. reward, a TV reconstruction and pleas from celebrities. Milly’s parents 
17. have had several false alarms. A body found in the Thames turned out to
18. be that of an elderly woman; a man arrested in Chertsey, Surrey, in 
19. connection with the teenager’s disappearance was released without 
20. charge and a prisoner at Belmarsh has also been questioned 
21. and released.
22. Mr Dowler said weekends were particularly difficult. “Any family 
23. occasions are really hard. Even other people’s birthdays. We go to send
24. them a card, and then it hits us – who do we sign it from? Now we just 
25. put ‘the Dowlers’. The Jubilee weekend was hellishly long.”
26. He added: “It’s impossible to describe the pain we are going through.
27. “We need to know where our daughter is and what has happened to 
28. her.”
FIGURE 1
Extract from newspaper article published following 
Amanda Dowler’s disappearance
The multiple uncertainties that define the missing are also protracted and
amplified over time, colonizing both the past and the future with seemingly
unanswerable questions: why did she/he leave? What happened? Where is
he/she now? When will he/she return? Boss (2002: 553) argues that these 
uncertainties create a further complication to the situation which defies but also
craves resolution by creating ‘confused perceptions about who is in or out of a
particular family’. Does the missing person still exist when they do not adhere to
private calendar relevant events (‘Father’s Day had been a bad day’; line 10;
‘There’s normally two cards’; line 14)? Despite her absence should Amanda still
be included in family definitions? Amanda Dowler’s father reports how they
now sign cards using the ambiguously inclusive referent ‘the Dowlers’
(Goodchild, 2002: line 25) to avoid definite removal of a particular family 
member for active calendar event marking (cf. Fravel and Boss, 1992; Hastings,
1999).5
The disruption that accompanies the absence of a family member forces a
reappraisal of how relationships should continue. Family members are waiting
for some sort of resolution (Goodchild, 2002: lines 27–8) but are mindful of the
potentially undesirable endings that might accomplish this. The waiting, though,
is not a passive or inert reaction but the combination of uncertainties through 
a prospective lens produces an anticipation (Gasparini, 2004) replete with 
apprehension.
Missing in Action: Waiting, Uncertainty and Apprehension
While the missing person is physically absent she is also psychologically 
present (Boss, 1999). The emotional presence typically takes some form of
apprehension. The following indicative extracts are taken from missing person
appeals and demonstrate a range of reactions to the uncertainties surrounding the
missing person’s absence and lack of communication:
The family fears for Francesca as she often feels quite agitated and confused. (20
September 2003)
His family are very concerned about him. They say, ‘we are desperately worried
to hear news’. (10 May 2002)
Everyone is worried about his welfare. (10 July 2004)
Amrita’s mum, older brother and the rest of the family are desperately worried for
her. (4 February 2001)
Mark’s friends and family have become increasingly worried about him. (10
January 2001)
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. . . has not contacted her family who are desperately worried for her. (7 June
2002)
They are very anxious to contact him. (30 February 2002)
His mother is deeply concerned about him and asks him to call. (20 September
2004)
Worry, as these extracts indicate, is not a complete action; worry in general craves
resolution. Worry, here, in particular, longs for some contact from the missing
person. In this respect, as Phillips (1993) has it, worry is an ‘ironic form of hope’
to the extent that ‘worrying implies a future, a way of looking forward to things. It
is a conscious conviction that a future exists, one in which something terrible
might happen’ (p. 56). Worry and hope both reveal the future to be uncertain and
both tend, though in contrasting modes, to work towards an outcome that can
reduce the uncertainty on which each is premised and thrives (Bradac, 2001).
Worry, while implying a future, is also stasis inducing because, as Phillips (1993:
41) also argues, it also ‘fixes the worrier in the present’. Apprehension anticipates
a future that will not be realizable until there are changes to the current uncer-
tainty. The fixing of the family members through the suspension of routine rela-
tionship-appreciating events and through worry reconfigures missing and renders
it akin to waiting in general and waiting for resolution in particular.
The interstitial action of waiting can be bracketed off from other social 
activities by being located in specially designated spaces (such as waiting
rooms, bus stops and the like) but waiting also creates its own space (Gasparini,
1995) where hope and worry engage the future in an extended or suspended 
present. As Thomas Mann (1962) elegiacally suggests in his characterization of
waiting, it ‘means regarding time and the present moment not as a boon, but an
obstruction’. He continues, ‘it means making their actual content null and void 
. . . Waiting, we say, is long. We might just as well – or more accurately – say it
is short, since it consumes whole spaces of time without our living them or 
making any use of them as such’ (p. 279). Fuchs (2001) proposes that such 
stasis, torpor or inability to act can be ‘interpreted as the result of a desynchro-
nization’, that is, ‘an uncoupling in the temporal relation of organism and envi-
ronment, or of individual and society’. The uncertainty and the worry that fixes
family members in the present avoiding undesirable futures, as the data will
demonstrate, literally and figuratively, restricts them. Just as, Amanda Dowler’s
family reported uncertainty of how to mark existing private calendar events it
also seems that the potential for making new events significant to their ongoing
relationships is also impeded.
The next two extracts from the episode of public participation television
reveal the mother of a missing son inviting him directly to contribute to her 
wedding (see Appendix for a list of transcription conventions):
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[Christine’s sons David (aged 13) left his family home on 26 December 1996,
apparently to stay with his 11-year-old friend, Paddy Warren, but did not arrive
there. At the time of the broadcast they have been missing for three years. In the
previous turn the host has been discussing what might have prompted her son’s
absence.]
1. Christine: life’s on hold (.) I mean I I’m frightened to go away
2. I’ve I’ve recently married this year (.) I’ve been
3. with my partner 14 years and we’ve recently
4. married this year . . . so we married in May this
5. year I had it put in the papers asking David to come
6. back to give me away (.) nothing came of that (.) and
7. um (.) it’s just been it’s absolutely (.) torment (.) I
8. can’t go away on honeymoon (.) I couldn’t go away on
9. honeymoon because I was frightened to death (.) just in
10. case I went away and David got in touch [with me].
11. Host: [it was] the day
12. he turned up.
Amid Christine’s description of the anxiety and restrictions (‘frightened to go
away’ (line 1); ‘it’s absolutely torment’ (line 7); ‘frightened to death’ (line 9))
generated by her son’s three-year absence and lack of communication she 
intimates that her marriage to her partner was used as an invitation to her son
David to renew their lapsed relationship (lines 5–6). Despite embarking on her
own personal calendar-making practices (her marriage), the effects of her son’s
absence seem to truncate what would be the normative events following 
marriage (lines 8–9). It seems that attempts to continue life without her missing
son, to make events that might operate as new marks on their own private calen-
dar are embarked upon reluctantly, are not wholly successful and strongly 
related to the desire for the significant presence of her missing son.
The relevance or denial of relevance are also evident in missing person
appeals where reports of meaningful events are used as forms of inducements to
encourage the reparticipation of the missing person:
There are two new additions to the family and it would be lovely for Tony to see
them. (20 April 2001)
They are very anxious about her well-being and have important family news. (20
May 2002)
Rob’s sister, Maureen, would love to hear he is safe and well saying the she has
some important news to tell him. (30 June 2001)
The reports of significant changes (‘two new additions’) or events (‘important
family news’; ‘important news’) are appended to expressions of concern (‘They
are very anxious about her well-being’) and requests for some action by the
missing person (‘would love to hear he is safe and well’; ‘it would be lovely for
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Tony to see them’) and act as invitations and incentives for the missing person
to renew contact.
It seems that without acknowledgement by the missing person the changes to
the family members’ lives are diminished in some way. The next extract demon-
strates how apparent suspension of ‘normal’ service which was summarized by
Christine (‘life’s on hold’; line 1) also encapsulates the effects a missing per-
son’s absence has on private calendar making more generally. Later in the
broadcast data Val describes family’s reaction to her 16-year-old-son’s absence
as literal immobility.
[Val’s 16-year-old son (Damien) did not return from a party and has been missing
three years.]
1. Val: we live on the island Isle of Wight (.) we were due to
2. move to the mainland obviously we felt at that point
3. when Damien went missing (.) we couldn’t move cos any
4. time he might come home (.) [and]
5. Host: [how] old was he?
Val reports how her family have suspended events which would otherwise form
part of a private calendar as inevitable immobility (‘we couldn’t move; line 3).
Plans (‘we were due to move’; lines 1–2) which were under way prior to the
missing person’s absence are cancelled, postponed or temporarily unrealizable.6
This stasis, the worry, the waiting help explain why it is not without 
poignancy that the typical description of people who miss people is framed as
‘people left behind’ (Weitzman, 1970; Hepworth and Featherstone, 1973; Boss,
1999) in (calendar-making) time and space.
It seems that family members struggle with multiple uncertainties regarding
why the missing person is absent and where he/she is but perhaps the most dis-
tressing consequence is trying to imagine and explain why the missing person is
not (able to be) in touch with them. In this final section I identify how the 
duration of the absence seems to provide a way of accounting for the missing
person’s enduring lack of communication.
Accounting for the Lack of Communication: 
The Longer You Leave It the Harder It Is
The ongoing lack of communication that characterizes missing allows for the
potential inference that the missing person is not in touch, not because they are
somehow incapacitated but because they do not want to be; that family members
are not important enough, have some shortcomings or are in any other way
undesirable (Boss, 1999). This silence, as Poster (1990: 3) appreciates, is per-
versely amplified because of the ‘new level of interconnectivity’. The multiple
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modes that communication can take, in fact, ‘heighten[s] the fragility of social
networks’. It also means that some blame can be attributed to the missing person
for not getting in touch.
The first of the two following extracts sees the potential blame generated from
a lack of communication being resolved by positioning the missing person’s in-
action in line with some categorical group action (cf. Sacks, 1992a, 1992b). Then,
in the other extract, the potential culpability is managed through a different
device; by exploiting the duration of the absence/silence as an exonerating factor.
[Jo’s 16-year-old daughter, Helena, since returned, had been missing for six weeks
with her 30-year-old partner. Carol’s daughter Kathryn is 16 years old and has
been missing for six weeks. Christine’s 13 year old son has been missing for three
years.]
1. Host: and did you have any contact in that period?
2. Jo: uh you you wrote a a a letter once didn’t you?
3. Host: oh so you knew she was safe and she was alright?
4. Jo: I uh I uh and also that she was safe because the
5. police were were able to track her through her bank
6. card
7. Host: right, so it’s quite a different situation to (.)
8. [she wrote you a letter]
9. Carol: [if she’d only phone]
10. Host: yeah (.) sorry Carol
11. Carol: I mean if she’d only phone if she’d only phone cos
12. (.) I can’t understand why she doesn’t phone but the
13. thing is most of them don’t phone
14. (1.0)
15. Host: uh Chr- uh Christine
Here it is evident that communication (line 2) provides confirmation of the miss-
ing person’s her security and well-being (line 3). This experience is contrasted
with Carol’s report of the ongoing lack of communicative contact from her
daughter. During this exchange, Carol displays her desire for a similar action (‘if
she’d only phone; line 9) which would presumably bring about a similar diminu-
tion of disquiet. Carol elaborates her incomprehension (‘I can’t understand why
she doesn’t phone’; line 12). In order to dispel the potential accusation that the
lack of contact is a personal shortcoming peculiar to her daughter, Carol 
provides a description that downplays the deviance and locates her daughter’s
inactivity as a practice typically associated with a group (‘most of them’; line
13), to which she tacitly ascribes her daughter membership (cf. Watson, 1997).
Describing individual behaviour as part of group practice diffuses its potential
abnormality and absolves the missing person of individual responsibility.
The next excerpt reveals that making sense of the protracted lack of commu-
nication is of great concern for family members. It demonstrates an alternative
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device for normalizing the missing person’s lack of contact by foregrounding
the duration of the absence.
[Christine’s son, David (aged 13), left his family home on 26 December 1996,
apparently to stay with his 11-year-old friend Paddy Warren but did not arrive
there. He has been missing for three years. Helena was missing for six weeks but
has since returned.]
1. Christine: did you find that the longer you were gone the
2. harder it was to come home?
3. Helena: yeah (.) much harder
4. Christine: because I’ve been told by missing persons
5. that they find it very hard after they’ve been gone for so
6. [long]
7. Helena: [the long]er you leave it [definitely]
8. Christine: [to (.) come] [back]
9. Carol: [had] you told any
10. of your friends that you was [going]?
11. Helena: [no]
Christine, like Carol in one of the aforementioned extracts, locates the missing
person’s behaviour with already existing others (‘they’; line 5). This pattern of
conduct is reportedly supported by experts in the form of the external authority
(‘been told by missing persons’; line 4)7 and consolidated by Helena (a returned
missing person who in previous turns has been classified as a local expert by the
host (‘you know you’re the expert’; ‘Helena she’s our expert here’)). Helena
corroborates Christine’s speculation emphatically (‘the long]er you leave it 
[definitely]’; line 7).
Both Christine’s question, in lines 1–2, and Helena’s response, in line 7, 
suggest that a formulaic structure is available as a blame-diffusing and normal-
izing device. Indeed, when prompted later in the programme to give advice to
other missing people (‘hhh what would you say (.) to those who’ve run away?’),
Helena restates the duration of the absence as definitively influential on a miss-
ing person’s enduring lack of communicative contact (‘they do need to get in
contact (.) and from experience I know that the longer (.) you leave it the (.)
more difficult it gets’).
This form ‘the . . . er X the . . . Y’ is a recognizable idiomatic construction
(Nattinger and DeCarrico, 1992: 44; see also Wray, 2002: 48–50) with slots
which can be filled by various adjectives fast, slow and such like. In this data, 
the comparative structure tends to contain references to duration (longer) and
adversity (harder), difficult)]. The X and Y slots are filled by more or less
explicit reference to absence and lack of communication (to get in touch, call,
come back, phone). The structure ‘the . . . er X the . . . er Y’ also appears in
agnate forms (‘they find it very hard after they’ve been gone for so long’; lines
5–6; ‘the longer you leave it’; line 7).
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The structure ‘the . . . X the . . . er Y’ and agnates provide an alternative means
of normalizing a missing person’s lack of contact within a collective by con-
structing it formulaically as a routine articulation of an already existing practice.
The formula displays an internal equilibrium which operates as an equalizing
device. As a result activities are shorn of individual significance and work to
downplay any potential individual shortcoming or an assessment of the mini-
mum or maximum length of time of the absence and the ensuing silence which
would render contact (im)possible.
It seems that the longer the missing person is not in touch the harder it is for
the missing person to get in touch and for the remaining family members to con-
tinue marking or being to embark on new relationships.
Conclusion
Relationships are fragile; they require routine maintenance that demonstrates
‘affective concern’ (Baumeister and Leary, 1995: 500) which in turn demon-
strates each individual’s commitment to its continuity. Sacks’s (1987) notion of
the private calendar helps explicate the powerful ways that time can become 
personalized and indicate the relevance of people to that relationship.
However, when someone is missing, denies someone else contact, and with-
draws (or is withdrawn) from a social network, life for the remaining family
members is thrown into a phase of suspended animation, in literal and figurative
stasis, unable to satisfactorily complete normative life events and ‘move on’.
This stasis occurs because family members are waiting for some action (the
return of or some news of the missing person’s whereabouts). This kind of 
resolution would restart or, as Fuchs (2001) would have it, ‘resynchronize’ the
family members with his/her (social) environment. Family members become
fixed in a present (characteristically as ‘people left behind) and it is, it seems,
only with reluctance (and some guilt) that family members are able to embark on
making new private calendar events.
The guilt that family members may feel during the missing person’s enduring
lack of communication is partly informed by the inference that a missing person
is not in touch with them, not because they are incapacitated in some way, but
because he/she does not want to; the family members are no longer relevant.
This kind of wilful rejection can lead to the missing person being blamed for
his/her social inadequacy. Family members seem to want to protect the missing
person from such conclusion and they do so by exploiting a range of time refer-
ents to account for the missing person’s lack of communication. The emergent
formula, glossed here as, the longer you leave it the harder it is, identifies the
duration of the absence, rather than the missing person’s potentially wilful 
withdrawal, as the obstacle to renewing contact.
338 TIME & SOCIETY 15(2/3)
This formula is not only used in this order of missing but is apparent in more
mundane situations where previously frequent or regular contact diminishes.
Beyond this, it seems that missing additionally reveals a resistance to identify
one’s own personal undesirability as a plausible reason for one’s sudden or
accumulated irrelevance to a previously intimate or familiar other. So while
missing of this order is not a mundane phenomenon its extreme nature seems to
provide insight into the complexities and, importantly, the simple ways that we
use repetition and time to organize our relationships. 
Notes
My immeasurable thanks go to the insights of two anonymous reviewers.
1. For concision the term ‘family members’ will be used throughout the article. 
2. The UK police will treat an adult as missing if they are unexpectedly absent for around
72 hours. The significance of this length of time is to allow for absences that can be
culturally treated as ‘lost weekends’. This is not to say that people don’t privately (and
publicly) register the absence of someone, particularly children, after very much
shorter periods of time.
3. The original corpus consists of 215 appeals published in The Big Issue (a weekly mag-
azine sold in the UK by the vulnerably housed) from January 1999 to May 2000. More
recent examples of appeals have been used for illustration.
4. The episode entitled ‘Desperately Trying to Find a Missing Loved One’ was taken
from Kilroy broadcast on 27 October 1999. The benefits of using public participation
television as data lies in the fact that the participants (including the host) are making
versions of their experience publicly available because of and despite the constraints
of the context and regardless of any researcher’s agenda. Hutchby (1991) suggests that
the interface and negotiation of apparently personal and indisputably institutional con-
texts provides the means for common-sense understandings of the public world to
become available.
5. Amanda Dowler was buried on the anniversary of the day she ‘vanished’. This was
perhaps an attempt to erase the significance of the day she was reported missing by
creating a new calendar date with a practice of ritualised closure.
6. It transpires that this family have, indeed, reluctantly moved. The ongoing appeal,
available on the NMPH website (http://nmph.underwired.com/seen.php?show
all=yes#) states: ‘He comes from a close family who miss him terribly. Sadly, his 
family have had to move to USA for work since he disappeared but they are still 
hoping to hear news of Damien. His grandparents still live on the Isle of Wight.
Damien was 21 last June 2001’.
7. In line 4, ‘missing persons’ refers to The National Missing Person’s Helpline; a 
charity which supports missing people and ‘those who are left behind’.
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Appendix
Transcription conventions
The transcription conventions are modelled on those of Gail Jefferson (see Atkinson and
Heritage, 1984: ix–xvi):
(.) hearable pause
[ denotes start of simultaneous or overlapping utterances
] denotes end of simultaneous or overlapping utterances
= contiguous utterances with no discernible pause
hh audible exhalation
- denotes truncated word.
. . . denotes some text missing.
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